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Commentary on 
PM, Applicant v the Board of Management of St Vincent’s Hospital 
and Justin Geoghegan and the Attorney General, Respondents 
 
CLAIRE MURRAY 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The original case, JM, Applicant v the Board of Management of St Vincent’s Hospital and 
Justin Geoghegan and Attorney General, Respondents and PM, Notice Party,1 involved an 
urgent application to the High Court seeking an order directing the respondent hospital and 
consultant medical practitioner to administer appropriate treatment, including a liver 
transplant and a blood transfusion, to a woman, PM, who at the time of the hearing was in a 
coma and who had previously refused to accept the treatment. One of the reasons for the 
refusal was that PM had converted to the Jehovah’s Witness faith upon her marriage. 
Treatment refusal cases involving Jehovah’s Witnesses are not uncommon and there is 
relevant case-law from other jurisdictions.2 The applicant in the original case, JM, was PM’s 
husband. PM was a notice party to the original hearing but for obvious reasons was not 
present at the hearing and she was also not legally represented. The judgment was delivered 
by Finnegan P in the High Court and he made an order admitting PM to wardship and, 
exercising the inherent parens patriae jurisdiction of the court, directing the respondents to 
provide the necessary treatment.  
The feminist judgment arises from fictional new proceedings brought by PM in the 
High Court seeking a number of declarations from the court in light of the outcome of the 
original case. This approach was adopted by the feminist judge, Mary Donnelly, for a number 
of reasons. First, because the original case was heard by the High Court in urgent 
circumstances with one judge sitting alone, a dissenting judgment would not have been 
possible. Secondly, given that the treatment ordered was described as urgent and life-saving, 
any appeal would also have been decided in urgent circumstances. The decision not to 
provide a replacement judgment was based on the fact that a feminist judge would have 
elicited different information from the hearing to that provided. These limitations would also 
apply to an appeal. By re-opening the matter as a set of new proceedings seeking declarations 
in relation to the conduct of the original hearing the feminist judgment is able to engage with 
the reasoning in that judgment, to acknowledge the constraints within which Finnegan P was 
operating, but also to illustrate that another approach might have been possible had greater 
emphasis been placed on recognising and understanding PM as an autonomous individual 
situated within a relational context. A broadly similar approach was adopted in Fitzpatrick v 
K,3 which postdates JM, but which also involved an urgent application to court seeking an 
order to provide a blood transfusion without consent.  
                                                          
1 JM, Applicant v the Board of Management of St Vincent’s Hospital and Justin Geoghegan and Attorney 
General, Respondents and PM, Notice Party [2003] 1 IR 321. 
2In England and Wales see Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1992] 3 WLR 782; from Canada see 
Malette v Shulman et al (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 321 (Ont CA). 
3 Fitzpatrick v K [2008] IEHC 104. 
The feminist judgment also identifies specific declarations sought in order to delimit 
the scope of the matters before the court to those at issue in the original decision. Thus, a 
decision was made to exclude a claim for damages.  
 
 
Placing PM at the centre of the judgment 
 
A key objective of the project of feminist judging is to tell the story of the case in as full a 
manner as possible and to provide the context in which the decision took place. One aspect of 
doing this is to place the individual most affected by the decision at the centre of the 
judgment. In the original judgment PM was not a party to the case. She was not legally 
represented and one consequence of this was that her voice was not heard, or at the very least 
there was nobody to put her perspective before the court and to test the medical evidence 
presented to the court.  Throughout the judgment by Finnegan P there are multiple references 
to PM’s husband, and to the extent that we hear the perspective of PM it is related first 
through her husband and then through Finnegan P. This silencing of PM is a matter of 
significant concern in the feminist judgment. The ongoing failure of the courts to address this 
issue is evident in the recent High Court decision of PP v HSE,4 discussed below. 
The final sentence of the original judgment is ‘[i]n those circumstances it is an easy 
decision.’ The characterisation of the decision in this case as easy is perplexing, as the court 
was called upon to make a decision about whether to uphold a refusal of treatment, when the 
refusal to sign the consent form occurred in difficult circumstances, and at the time of the 
hearing PM was in a coma and her husband was seeking to have the treatment refusal set 
aside. However, the two sentences preceding the final sentence are: ‘She has a child and a 
loving husband. The medical evidence is that she has a 60% chance of survival.’ The 
reasoning, therefore, seems to be that because she has a husband and child she has something 
to live for and so should not be permitted to die. This appears to accord limited, if any, 
weight to PM’s own views regarding the refusal of treatment. It also echoes case-law in 
England and Wales in relation to the refusal by women of caesarean sections. In Re S (Adult: 
Refusal of Treatment)5 following an ex parte hearing the declaration to carry out a caesarean 
section was granted on the basis that it was in the best interests of S and the unborn child. The 
judgment in Re S was not well received and subsequent cases moved away from a reliance on 
the best interests of the foetus and instead restated the importance of the autonomy of the 
individual woman. However, notwithstanding the more pro-autonomy rhetoric, in practice 
courts have tended to find that the women seeking to refuse the caesarean section lack 
capacity. In many of these cases the autonomy and agency rights of the woman involved are 
blurred and undermined, usually through a finding that the women lacked capacity to refuse 
treatment, in order to vindicate what are perceived to be the rights or interests of the foetus. 
For example, in Re MB (An Adult: Medical Treatment),6 the Court of Appeal found that MB 
lacked capacity to make the decision regarding the caesarean section because of her needle 
phobia – the reasoning was that the fear of needles dominated her thinking and rendered her 
temporarily lacking in capacity.7  In contrast to the judgment of Finnegan P the feminist 
judgment by Donnelly J emphasises that this is a difficult and challenging decision for the 
                                                          
4 PP v HSE [2014] IEHC 622. 
5 Re S (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 671. 
6 Re MB (An Adult: Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FCR 541. 
7 A similar approach was adopted in Tameside and Glossop Acute Services v CH [1996] 1 FLR 76; Norfolk and 
Norwich Healthcare NHS Trust v W [1996] 2 FLR 6; and Bolton Hospitals NHS Trust v O [2002] EWHC 2871. 
See also Katherine Wade, ‘Refusal of Emergency Caesarean Section in Ireland: A Relational Approach’ (2013) 
22(1) Medical Law Review 1-30. 
judge. On the one hand there is the need to respect the agency and autonomous choice of the 
individual woman; and on the other there is the need to recognise the situated position of PM 
within her family context.  
Hunter outlines a number of features of feminist approaches to judgment-writing and 
notes that several of these relate to the procedures of decision-making, among them 
‘“including women” both in terms of writing women’s experiences into legal discourse (as 
individual litigants and collectively, drawing on relevant research evidence) and in the 
construction of legal rules.’8 One of the core objectives in this feminist approach to the case 
was to make PM visible within the judgment to the greatest extent possible. The feminist 
judgment places PM front and centre. Not only does it begin by setting out the available facts 
relating to PM, thus making her real and a key actor within the case, but it also highlights, 
through a discussion of the right to fair procedures and the requirement for legal 
representation, the manner in which she was silenced and rendered invisible in the original 
judgment. While reliance on fair procedures and constitutional justice is perhaps not an 
evident feminist methodology in itself, this approach is one that could plausibly have been 
adopted by a court in Ireland at that time and it allows for an articulation of the significant 
feminist concerns at the heart of the case. This approach reflects Nedelsky’s argument, from a 
feminist perspective, about the importance of due process not just as an end in itself, but also 
as a means to an end, and as a way to ensure and support the exercise of autonomy.9 The 
importance of participating in decisions that affect a person is neatly captured by Nedelsky 
who states that ‘[t]he right to a hearing declares their views to be significant, their 
contribution to be relevant. In principle, a hearing designates recipients as part of the process 
of collective decision-making rather than as passive, external objects of judgment.’10 
PM was denied that right to participate in the original hearing of this case and was 
certainly a passive object of the judgment of Finnegan P. Undoubtedly, the fact that she was 
in a coma at the time of the hearing in the High Court did provide a barrier to participation, 
but not an insurmountable one. By way of illustration, in the case of PP v HSE11 a woman, 
NP, who had suffered a brain injury resulting in brain stem death was artificially maintained 
alive on life support in order to preserve the life of her foetus.12 As in JM a family member, 
NP’s father, was obliged to apply to the High Court to seek a declaration to have life support 
withdrawn. NP was assigned legal representation, as was the foetus. This was with the 
agreement of the High Court during a case directions hearing prior to the hearing of the 
substantive matter. No further details of the arguments presented to the High Court at that 
prior hearing are available. The issue at the core of that particular case was whether switching 
off the life-support machine would violate the constitutionally protected right to life of the 
unborn. Clearly the PP case postdates JM but the principles of constitutional justice/fair 
procedures which gave rise to the appointment of representation were well established at the 
time of the decision in JM. This is illustrated in the feminist judgment when Donnelly J uses 
the decision in SPUC v Coogan13 to show the importance afforded by the Irish courts to 
ensuring that the rights of those who could not represent themselves (in Coogan, the 
“unborn”) are protected.   
                                                          
8 Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley (eds), Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010) 35. 
9 Jennifer Nedelsky, ‘Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities’ (1989) 1 Yale Journal of 
Law and Feminism 7. 
10 Nedelsky, ibid 27. 
11 Above n 4. 
12 There appears to be some disagreement in the judgment on the precise age of the foetus, but somewhere 
between 13 and 15 weeks was generally agreed. 
13 SPUC v Coogan [1989] IR 734. 
It is, however, important to recognise the difficulties with allocating legal 
representation to a person in PM’s circumstances – this is to say in a coma and unable to 
provide any instructions to her legal representatives. There exists the very real risk that the 
voice of the individual and her wishes will not necessarily be presented to the court, but 
rather what the appointed legal representative considers to be in her best interests. 
Nevertheless, the reasoning behind the approach adopted by Donnelly J is that by appointing 
legal representation to PM in these circumstances the court would at least increase the 
chances of her voice being heard in the proceedings. It would also be possible for the legal 
representative to, at a very minimum, challenge the medical evidence put before the court as 
to why a blood transfusion and liver transplant was necessary and to explore the possibility of 
alternative courses of action open to the court rather than imposing invasive treatment on PM 
in the absence of her consent. While this may be less than ideal it is an improvement on the 
alternative course of action that was adopted in the original case. 
 
 
Agency 
 
There are a number of layers to PM’s case. On a surface level it concerns the right to refuse 
life-sustaining medical treatment and the associated rights of autonomy and bodily integrity. 
These are significant issues of feminist concern. However, it also draws attention to the 
importance of agency. The failure to recognise and respect the agency of women has been 
identified in similar projects. Hunter, McGlynn and Rackley note that ‘women often find that 
when they attempt to exercise agency, such as in the context of refusing to consent to sexual 
activity or medical treatment, they are not taken seriously.’14  
There is certainly a sense in the original judgment in JM that PM’s decision to refuse 
treatment is not given the due consideration and respect that it deserves. It is characterised as 
a decision that was taken merely to please her husband. The assumption is that this means 
that it was not her decision. There are two difficulties with this approach. First, it discounts 
the possibility that as a result of her studies to join the Jehovah’s Witness faith PM had in fact 
adopted those beliefs and would not wish to accept a blood transfusion for her own deeply 
held religious reasons. It also presumes that PM only adopted a new system of religious belief 
because of her cultural background, rather than allowing for the possibility that PM had given 
some level of thought to the decision to convert to the Jehovah’s Witness faith. The reference 
to culture in the original judgment is striking. In 2003 Ireland was experiencing an increase in 
immigration and as a result was dealing with relatively new cultural challenges around 
accommodating a wider variety of cultural narratives within the State. At that time African 
women in particular were coming to the attention of the State during pregnancy, amid claims 
that they were having children in Ireland in order to gain a right to residency by having a 
citizen-child.15 Following on from this there was the Supreme Court decision in Lobe and 
Osayande16 which found that migrant parents could no longer be permitted to remain in 
Ireland to bring up their children. The feminist re-writing of this judgment by Siobhán 
Mullally and Cliodhna Murphy can be found in this collection.17 This developing discourse 
ultimately resulted in what was known as the citizenship referendum in 2004 which removed 
                                                          
14 Above n 8 at 22. 
15 For further discussion see Ronit Lentin, ‘Migrant women’s networking: New articulations of transnational 
ethnicity’ in Gargi Bhattacharyya (ed) Ethnicities and Values in a Changing World (Fanham and Burlington 
VT, Ashgate, 2009) and Siobhán Mullally, ‘Citizenship and Family Life in Ireland: Asking the Question “Who 
Belongs”?’ (2005) 25(4) Legal Studies 341-358.  
16 Lobe and Osayande [2003] 1 IR 1.  
17 See ch 13. 
the automatic right to citizenship from all children born in the State and limited it to those 
children who had at least one parent who was an Irish citizen or entitled to Irish citizenship.18 
References to culture at this time therefore were often shorthand for an ongoing and complex 
debate around Irishness, citizenship and the State. By way of contrast in the feminist 
judgment Donnelly J emphasises the dangers associated with cultural stereotyping. The 
original judgment also assumes that PM’s religious conversion took place without a full 
appreciation of the consequences of taking on that faith. This latter assumption is undermined 
by the evidence that PM was aware of the importance of refusing or accepting the blood 
transfusion and as a result wished to discuss it with her husband and to have his input into the 
decision.  
Second, the approach adopted by Finnegan P suggests that making a decision because 
PM believed that is what her husband wanted and that his opinion was an important 
consideration for her indicates that it is not a valid exercise of her autonomy and right to 
make decisions about how she conducts her life. This reflects an individualistic approach to 
decision-making which does not necessarily accord with the reality of decision-making for 
many people. From the evidence that PM asked her husband ‘what he would do in the 
situation’ it appears that PM was attempting to engage in a more relational decision-making 
process, which recognised her situated nature as a wife and mother, and understood that her 
decision had implications for those around her. However, it seems that PM’s husband did not 
engage with her in this process as he advised her that it was her decision to make. It appears 
that this left PM feeling uncertain and confused. As noted by Donnelly J in the feminist 
judgment it is unclear whether PM received any other support from those in the hospital 
charged with her care and treatment. This failure to engage with PM at a difficult time when 
she was seeking support to clarify and communicate her wishes is deeply troubling. While the 
law cannot compel family members to participate in relational decision-making it can, and 
should, ensure that where a situation such as that of PM arises those professionally caring for 
the person fill the vacuum left by the family and provide the necessary support.   
The complexity of the situation is also evident in the contradictory approach adopted 
by the court; on the one hand refusing to accept PM’s refusal of treatment on the basis that 
she was refusing because she was doing what her husband wanted, and on the other justifying 
the decision to provide treatment without consent in part on the basis that it is what her 
husband wanted and that this fact would comfort PM. As Donnelly notes, the judgment of the 
High Court in the original decision in JM ‘shows both the dangers of taking a social or 
relational approach to agency and the dangers of not doing so.’19  
 
 
The importance of a relational approach to autonomy 
 
Feminist theory has used the concept of relational autonomy to address issues around agency. 
This is subject to varied definitions.20 However it often draws on critical feminist theories and 
as Nedelsky notes ‘one of the contributions of feminism to relational theory is that it is 
                                                          
18 This was the twenty-seventh amendment to the Constitution and the referendum was passed by a significant 
majority - 1,427,520 votes in favour and 375,695 votes against. 
19 Mary Donnelly, Healthcare Decision-Making and the Law: Autonomy, Capacity and the Limits of Liberalism 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010) 62. 
20 Catriona McKenzie and Natalie Stoljar (eds), Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, 
Agency and the Social Self (Oxford, OUP, 2000); Jonathan Herring, Caring and the Law (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2009); Shelley Day Sclater, Fatemeh Ebtehaj, Emily Jackson, and Martin Richards (eds), Regulating 
Autonomy: Sex, Reproduction and Family (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009). 
particularly unlikely to make the mistake of romanticising community or relationship.’21 
Theories of relational autonomy therefore emphasise the individual in context while also 
retaining the importance of autonomy. Elements of this approach are evident in the feminist 
judgment. Nedelsky sees the aim of relational autonomy as ‘transforming a traditionally 
individual conception of the self into a relational one without subsuming the individual into 
the collective.’22 The conception of autonomy within a relational approach is different to that 
set out in the traditional liberal understanding. According to Nedelsky, under a relational 
approach autonomy is not equated with independence but rather ‘autonomy is made possible 
by constructive relationships.’23 Therefore it is through the existence of positive relationships 
and supports, including relationships of care, that individuals are in a position to exercise 
autonomy. One of the strengths of relational autonomy from a feminist perspective is that it 
does not assume that all relationships are beneficial and it does not seek to maintain them in 
all circumstances.24 A functioning relational approach to law therefore should operate to 
balance the rights and needs of both parties and allow individuals to extricate themselves 
from bad relationships and enhance positive relationships which support the exercise of 
autonomy. 
The concept of a constructive relationship working to strengthen and enhance 
autonomy resonates in the context of the PM case. To the extent that we get a picture of PM 
from the original judgment what we see is a woman reaching out to her husband for support 
and guidance in making a difficult decision in challenging circumstances. She was seeking to 
rely on what she appeared to understand to be a mutually supportive and presumably 
constructive relationship to assist her in making an autonomous choice. She did not, it 
appears, conceive of the decision to be made as a purely independent one that she alone was 
responsible for making. That does not mean, however, that she was giving up the right to 
make her decision, or that her wishes and needs should cede priority to those of others within 
the family group or relationship. This is where the judgment of Finnegan P runs into 
difficulty from a feminist and a relational autonomy perspective. He recognises the 
importance of relationships, highlighting that PM has a loving husband and child, but in 
doing so he privileges the wishes of JM and attributes those to PM without giving sufficient 
consideration to whether the evidence in fact supports that conclusion. It may well be the case 
that had JM expressed his wish that PM take the blood products at the time when PM was 
seeking to discuss the issue with him that she would have weighed that heavily in her 
decision-making process. Clearly JM’s input was important to her. However, that moment 
had passed and PM was no longer in a position to factor that information into her autonomous 
decision. Finnegan P’s relational approach in this case, which had the effect of placing PM at 
the periphery of this case rather than at the centre, did not enhance the autonomy or agency of 
PM.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As this feminist judgment is not a first instance judgment, Donnelly J was not faced with the 
difficult decision about whether to make an order directing the hospital to provide treatment 
or upholding the right to refuse treatment with the consequence that PM would die. However, 
                                                          
21 Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy and Law (Oxford, OUP, 2011) 
32. 
22 ibid 13. 
23 ibid 118. 
24 Mary Donnelly and Claire Murray, ‘The Role of Family in Mental Health Law: A Framework for 
Transformation’ (2013) 25(4) Child and Family Law Quarterly 380, 399. 
it was also the situation that no new evidence was put before the court and so in reviewing the 
original decision of the High Court Donnelly J was required to determine if, given the facts 
that were before the court at the time the original decision was made, the High Court adopted 
the correct approach. Ultimately the feminist judgment finds that the procedure adopted by 
Finnegan P in the High Court was inadequate and breached PM’s constitutional right to fair 
procedures. This failure to adhere to fair procedures and to permit PM to participate in the 
decision-making process may well have had an impact on the evidence that was before the 
court, as PM’s position was not fully articulated and discussed before the court. Nor was the 
evidence of the other parties to the case tested. In identifying these procedural shortcomings 
this feminist judgment also highlights that feminist judging is about more than just the act of 
writing judgments that draw on feminist theories or feminist teachings. It emphasises that a 
feminist judge would have approached the case in a fundamentally different manner – a 
feminist judge hearing this case in urgent circumstances would most likely have asked 
different questions, he or she would have identified different material as relevant to making 
the decision, and had such an approach been taken at that point it may have been the case that 
the judgment delivered would have been different.  
Based on the evidence that was before the court, Donnelly J determined that it was not 
possible to find that PM had exercised a fully autonomous choice to refuse treatment and 
therefore Finnegan P in the High Court did not violate her rights in ordering the provision of 
the necessary treatment. This conclusion could be seen as falling into the same pattern as 
existing case-law on treatment refusal outlined above, of strongly upholding the right to 
refuse in principle but not following through in practice. However, the strength of this 
feminist judgment lies in the manner in which it illustrates the importance of proper and fair 
procedures, both as an end in and of themselves, but also as a means to an end. In this case 
the procedural shortcomings which resulted in PM’s voice being silenced had a very direct 
and significant impact on the ability of the court to adequately vindicate the substantive right 
to autonomy. Participation as a means to enhance and secure autonomy is therefore at the 
centre of this case and the contribution of the feminist judgment to discussion in this field is 
to illustrate this within the context of treatment refusal.  
PM, Applicant v. the Board of Management of St Vincent’s Hospital  
and Justin Geoghegan and the Attorney General, Respondents 
 
High Court              18th June, 2003 
 
Donnelly J.               18th June, 2003 
[1] PM has applied to this Court for declaratory relief in respect of medical treatment 
which was administered to her, notwithstanding her prior refusal to sign a consent form, 
following an order of Finnegan P., dated 24th October 2002 (reported in JM, Applicant v the 
Board of Management of St Vincent’s Hospital and Justin Geoghegan, Respondents and PM, 
Notice Party [2003] 1 I.R. 321). This order authorised the respondents to provide to PM 
appropriate medical treatment, including a liver transplant and blood transfusion. This is not a 
rehearing of the case and no new evidence is introduced. Rather, the court proceeds on the 
basis of the evidence which was before the court at the time the matter was heard.  
[2] PM requests the court to make the following declarations:- 
(a) A declaration that her right to constitutional justice and fair procedures under 
Article 40.3.1° of the Constitution was breached by the order of the High Court for 
the administration of treatment to her without her consent which was made without 
independent legal representation 
(b) A declaration that the order of the High Court to authorise the administration 
of treatment to her in the absence of her consent failed to respect her rights to 
autonomy and bodily integrity under Article 40.3.1° of the Constitution. 
 
The Facts 
 
[3] On 24th October 2002, JM, the husband of PM, made an application to the High 
Court for an order to authorise the administration of appropriate medical treatment, including 
a liver transplant and the administration of blood transfusion(s) to PM, notwithstanding that 
on 20th October PM had refused to sign a consent form in respect of this treatment.  PM’s 
decision to refuse treatment derived from her religious beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness. 
Abstention from blood represents a fundamental tenet of this religious faith.   
[4] At the time of the application PM was on medication and on a ventilator. She was 
in a coma and was unable to communicate her present views regarding the proposed 
treatment. The medical evidence provided to the Court was that, although there was a 
possibility that PM could recover consciousness, this was unlikely to occur in sufficient time 
to allow the necessary treatment to be provided. It was also asserted that it was unlikely that 
PM would be able to make a decision for herself during any period of recovery. The matter 
came before the Court in circumstances of considerable urgency due to the serious medical 
condition of PM. Medical evidence was provided that PM was critically ill and that she 
required immediate blood transfusions and a liver transplant. The medical experts stated that, 
if the treatments sought under the application were carried out, PM had a 60% chance of 
survival.  
[5] JM provided evidence to the Court. He stated that PM had become a Jehovah’s 
Witness on her marriage to him some months previously, having commenced studying to 
become a Jehovah’s Witness in March 2002.  JM also attested that, on 19th October, JM and 
PM had discussed the proposed treatment and JM ‘spoke to her and told her that the decision 
was important and that she shouldn’t feel obliged to refuse because of him as it was her 
decision’.  PM asked him what he would do in her situation but he said that he left the 
decision to her. She then said that she would think about the decision to be made. JM’s 
evidence is that PM was lucid at the time of this conversation. JM attested that the following 
day, PM’s condition had deteriorated. She was physically weaker; her speech was less clear 
and she also appeared to be less clear in her mind. When he spoke with her, she cried and said 
that she would take blood. He communicated this to the liver transplant team. However, ten 
minutes later, when a member of the liver transplant team came to PM and asked her to 
complete a consent form, she refused to do so.  
[6] Finnegan P. found that the Court’s authority to consider the matter derived from 
the parens patrie jurisdiction, the application of which in Ireland had been confirmed by 
Hamilton C.J. in In re a Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No. 2) [1996] 2 I.R. 
79, 103. He recognised, as stated by Hamilton C.J. in Re Ward of Court, the right of the 
competent adult who is a terminally ill patient to forego ongoing treatment and found that PM 
was terminally ill. However, he found that PM had not made ‘a clear final decision to have or 
not have the treatment.’ 
 
Conduct of the hearing 
 
[7] The manner in which the hearing was conducted is significant in respect of both 
declarations sought. Due to the medical circumstances, the hearing took place in urgent 
circumstances. For this reason, Finnegan P. proceeded on foot of a draft plenary summons 
and took evidence on oath. The application was brought by JM, PM’s husband. The first 
respondent was the Board of Management of the hospital in which PM was a patient and the 
second respondent, Mr Geoghegan, was the consultant surgeon who was responsible for the 
medical care of PM. PM was a notice party. The applicant was legally represented, as was Mr 
Geoghegan. Neither the first respondent nor PM was represented. 
 
Fair Procedures 
 
[8] The decision before the Court concerned one of the most serious matters which 
can come before a court of law: the resolution of a conflict between an individual’s life and 
her right to make fundamental decisions regarding how her life should be lived. The 
resolution of the application would result either in PM’s death or in a potentially profound 
bodily intrusion and, as PM may see it, a risk of her eternal damnation for failing to accord 
with the tenets of her religious faith. 
[9] The right to fair procedures derives from the common law and from the principle 
of constitutional justice which, as recognised first by Walsh J. in McDonald v Bord na gCon 
[1965] I.R. 217 is enshrined in Article 40.3.2°  of the Constitution. As has been recognised by 
the Supreme Court on many occasions, including In re Haughey [1971] I.R. 217 and The 
State (Gleeson) v Minister for Defence [1976] I.R. 280, the obligation to hear the other side – 
audi alteram partem – is core to the principle of constitutional justice. At the time of the 
hearing, PM was clearly not in a position to speak for herself and defend her rights. 
Moreover, she was not legally represented.  
[10] While it is not the case that respect for the principle of audi alteram partem 
requires that an affected party be afforded a right to independent legal representation in all 
instances, it has, on several occasions in the context of access to legal aid, been recognised by 
that the protection of the constitutional right to fair procedures requires the provision of legal 
representation (see Stevenson v Landy & others, unrep High Court, 10 February 1993 and 
Kirwan v Minister for Justice, Ireland and the Attorney General [1994] 2 I.R. 417). In 
Kirwan, in upholding a right to legal aid for a hearing of an application for release of a person 
who had been detained in the Central Mental Hospital, Lardner J found that, whether or not a 
right to legal aid existed depended on several factors: the seriousness of the charge; the nature 
of the penalty faced and the capacity of the person to speak for himself and defend himself. 
While clearly arising in a different context, the factors identified by Lardner J in Kirwan are 
relevant in this case. Applying these to the facts of this case, it is clear that the issue before 
the Court was very serious; the consequences of a decision either way were profound; and, 
PM could not speak for herself and defend her own interests.  
[11] I note also the decision of The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ltd 
v Coogan and Others [1989] I.R. 734 where the Supreme Court recognised the importance of 
ensuring the vindication of personal rights when the holder of rights is not in a position to 
vindicate his or her own rights. Although the circumstances were different - in Coogan, the 
party unable to vindicate his or her rights was the ‘unborn’ within the meaning of Article 
40.3.3° of the Constitution - the principle that in certain circumstances special procedures 
may be required to vindicate constitutional rights is applicable in this case. 
[12] There are also instrumental reasons why the lack of independent legal 
representation for PM was problematic. Within an adversarial system, such as ours, the lack 
of independent representation rendered it very difficult to reach even approximate 
conclusions regarding what PM would wish to happen. All information was mediated through 
JM who, inevitably, had his own distinct position on the matter to be determined and which 
may well have coloured the evidence presented. PM was at the centre of this case yet the 
Court was afforded limited opportunity to make determinations regarding her preferences or 
views. Although, those preferences would not necessarily be determinative, they must 
constitute a key aspect of judicial consideration.  
[13] The absence of legal representation for PM also restricted the capacity of the 
Court to engage in the necessary evaluation of the medical evidence. Medical evidence 
played a crucial role in this case. The urgent nature of the case was determined on the basis of 
medical evidence as was the need for the blood transfusions and liver transplant. However, 
medical evidence was also important in other respects. Important questions to be considered 
by the Court included the mental state of PM on the day on which she refused to sign the 
consent form and the extent to which medical staff engaged with PM in discussing the 
implications of her decision to refuse the proposed treatment and ensuring that she was fully 
informed of the consequences of the decision. Given the centrality of the medical evidence in 
this case, it was important for the Court to have an opportunity to evaluate the evidence 
provided through the process of cross-examination, which is at the core of our adversarial 
system of justice. Cross-examination would have afforded the Court an opportunity to 
evaluate the necessity of proposed actions and to consider whether there were alternatives to 
the treatment sought which might have been more respectful of PM’s wishes.  
[14] It is of course relevant that this case came before the Court in urgent 
circumstances. Where such circumstances arise, in the interests of the administration of 
justice, the court must respond. Certain procedural inadequacies may be overlooked and a 
more informal approach may be adopted. Steps such as proceeding on the basis of a draft 
plenary summons and taking evidence on oath, which were adopted in this case, may be 
justified on the basis of the constitutional obligation of the court to administer justice within 
the necessary time. However, there are fundamental elements of the process which cannot be 
set aside on the basis of the urgent circumstances. The function of the court is to administer 
justice and some procedural inadequacies are so fundamental as to limit the capacity of the 
court to do this. In the circumstances of this case, for the reasons outlined above, I am of the 
view that justice could not be administered without some form of representation of the person 
whose fundamental rights were at stake.  
[15] I am, of course, aware that independent legal representation does not, of itself, 
guarantee that the views of the individual whose rights are at issue will be represented 
adequately. For this reason, where possible, the services of a guardian ad litem should be 
utilised, as they were in the application for the withdrawal of treatment in Re a Ward of Court 
(withholding medical treatment) (No 2) [1996] 2 I.R. 79. I recognise that circumstances may 
arise where such services may not be possible and accept that the emergency nature of this 
case was one. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasise the strong principle that in a case 
such as this, which concerns fundamental constitutional rights, every effort should be made to 
ascertain and adequately represent the views of the person who is not able to represent her or 
himself and to ensure that legal representatives and guardians are held to account regarding 
their performance of this function by the court. 
[16] The importance of ensuring adequate representation of the person, whose rights 
are at issue, requires that, insofar as is possible, the practice of making applications of this 
kind in urgent circumstances must be avoided. In this case, PM declined to consent to 
treatment some four days prior to the hearing. It may well be the case that the urgency of the 
matter only became apparent with the passage of time. However, it may also be the case that 
an application could have been made at an earlier point and that, had this occurred, more 
attention could have been given to ensuring adequate representation of PM.  
[17] The application in this case was made by JM, PM’s husband. Having to make the 
application must have added considerably to JM’s emotional distress at a very difficult time.  
A question arises as regards what would have happened if JM had not brought this 
application. Would the respondent have sought the involvement of the court or would PM’s 
lack of consent have been considered determinative, notwithstanding that there may have 
been reasons to question the validity of her refusal? The involvement of the court in a matter 
of fundamental rights should not be dependent on whether or not a spouse or family member 
decides to refer the matter for judicial consideration.  In this respect, I agree with Lord 
Donaldson M.R. who, in broadly similar circumstances, in Re T Adult: Refusal of Medical 
Treatment [1992]3 W.L.R. 782 at page 798, stated that the step of seeking court involvement 
‘should not be left to the patient’s family, who will probably not know of the facility and may 
be inhibited by questions of expense’.  This accords with the ‘public interest in the 
vindication of [a] private right which has been guaranteed by the Constitution’, which was 
identified by Walsh J in The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ltd  v Coogan 
and Others [1989] I.R. 734 at page 743. 
 
The Requirement for Consent to Medical Treatment 
 
[18] At the hearing of this matter, the Court was informed that on 20th October, PM 
refused to sign a consent form given to her by a member of the liver transplant team. The 
importance of consent to medical treatment was described by Denham J. in In re a Ward of 
Court (withholding medical treatment) (No. 2) [1996] 2 I.R. 79 at page 156 as follows: 
Medical treatment may not be given to an adult person of full capacity without his or 
her consent. There are a few rare exceptions to this e.g., in regard to contagious 
diseases or in a medical emergency where the patient is unable to communicate. This 
right arises out of civil, criminal and constitutional law. If medical treatment is given 
without consent it may be trespass against the person in civil law, a battery in criminal 
law, and a breach of the individual's constitutional rights. 
[19] Although it is common practice for hospitals to require patients to complete 
consent forms, the completion of such forms should not be confused with the actuality of 
consent.  The existence of a form certainly makes life easier for medical professionals and 
indeed for the court. However, a consent form is no more than evidence of consent. The 
reason this case arises is not because PM did not complete a consent form but because by 
refusing to complete the consent form, she indicated that she did not consent to the treatment. 
Thus, the court’s concern is not with the absence of a signed consent form but with what this 
absence means about PM’s wishes. 
[20] In In re a Ward of Court, the Supreme Court upheld the right to refuse treatment 
(in this case artificial nutrition and hydration) of a woman who, as a result of a medical 
catastrophe which had occurred some 23 years previously, was in a ‘near PVS state’. The 
right was derived from the constitutionally protected rights to autonomy and self-
determination and the right to privacy, protected under Article 40.3.1° of the Constitution. 
Hamilton C.J. at page 125 accepted the view which had been put forward by the former 
President of the High Court, writing extra-judicially, that ‘[a] competent adult if terminally ill 
has the right to forgo or discontinue life-saving treatment’. He further found at page 126 that 
the Ward was terminally (rather than chronically) ill on the basis that, without the 
nourishment being provided to her by the treatment in question, she would die. The right to 
refuse treatment was also recognised by Denham J. who found at page 156 that ‘[i]f medical 
treatment is given without consent it may be trespass against the person in civil law, a battery 
in criminal law, and a breach of the individual's constitutional rights.’  Although Hamilton 
C.J. identified a right to refuse treatment only in circumstances of terminal illness, it is clear 
from his finding that the Ward was terminally ill that Hamilton C.J. did not regard terminal 
illness as arising only in circumstances in which the trajectory of a disease will lead to 
inevitable death. On the basis of Hamilton C.J.’s understanding, PM would also be 
considered to be terminally ill. This was also the approach taken by Finnegan P. in respect of 
the original application.  
[21] Moreover, even if one were to adopt a less expansive understanding of terminal 
illness, there is nothing in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Re a Ward of Court to 
indicate that a right to refuse treatment should not extend to a patient who is not terminally 
ill. In her extensive judgment, Denham J does not refer to the nature of the patient’s illness 
and states the right to refuse treatment in terms which indicate that it applies to all patients of 
full age and capacity on an equal basis regardless of the nature of their illness.  
[22] An important aspect of the right to refuse treatment as identified by Denham J. is 
that the right does not depend on the court’s assessment of the rationality of the reasons for 
the refusal. Denham J. stated at page 156 that ‘[t]he consent which is given by an adult of full 
capacity is a matter of choice. It is not necessarily a decision based on medical 
considerations. Thus, medical treatment may be refused for other than medical reasons, or 
reasons most citizens would regard as rational, but the person of full age and capacity may 
make the decision for their own reasons.’ Thus, it is not for this Court to determine whether 
or not PM’s decision to refuse treatment is appropriate or reasonable. Rather, the function of 
the Court is to determine whether, in the circumstances of this case, PM’s constitutionally 
protected right to refuse treatment should be upheld. 
 
Status of Advance Refusals in Irish Law 
 
[23] In the passage referred to above, Denham J. identified as an exception to the 
requirement for consent, the situation of a medical emergency where the patient is unable to 
communicate. This case is different to that envisaged by Denham J., because although PM 
was unable to communicate her consent or refusal contemporaneously, she had in advance 
indicated a refusal of treatment. The matter of a non-contemporaneous refusal of treatment 
has not to date been considered by the courts in this jurisdiction. However, courts in other 
jurisdictions have on several occasions upheld a right to refuse treatment, including life-
saving treatment, in circumstances in which the refusal had been stated in advance and the 
patient was unable to communicate current wishes. In several of these cases, the refusal has 
derived from the patient’s religious belief as a Jehovah’s Witness. In the Canadian case of 
Malette v Shulman et al (1990) 67 D.L.R. (4th) 321, 330 Robins J.A., found that ‘A doctor is 
not free to disregard a patient's advance instructions any more than he would be free to 
disregard instructions given at the time of the emergency.’ A similar approach to advance 
instructions may be found in decisions from England and Wales including the decision of the 
Court of Appeal in Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment [1992] 3 W.L.R. 782 and the 
High Court in Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1994] 1 W.L.R. 290. 
[24] It is difficult to see any reason in principle why the constitutionally protected 
right to refuse treatment should not apply, solely on the basis that the refusal is communicated 
in advance. In upholding the right to refuse treatment in Re a Ward of Court, the Supreme 
Court was clear that an individual’s constitutional rights are not lost because of insentience or 
incapacity.  As described by Denham J. at page 163 ‘[s]imply it means that the right [to 
privacy] may be exercised by a different process.’ There may, however, be differences at an 
evidentiary level in determining whether, in the circumstances of an individual case, an 
advance refusal should be upheld. I will return to this matter below. 
 
Other relevant Constitutional Rights 
 
[25] The right to refuse medical treatment is not the only right implicated in this case. 
Other relevant constitutional rights, which were also recognised in In re a Ward of Court, are 
the right to life and the right to bodily integrity. It should also be noted that PM has a 
constitutionally protected right under Article 44.2.1° to the free profession and practice of 
religion. As was recognised in Quinn’s Supermarket Ltd v Attorney General [1972] I.R. 1, 
this right is not restricted in its application to specified or designated religions and therefore 
would encompass PM’s faith as a Jehovah’s Witness. However, this right is not central to the 
determination of the matters at hand because the right to refuse treatment as recognised in In 
re a Ward of Court is not restricted to refusal on religious grounds only.  
[26] The right to life is of particular relevance in the circumstances of this case given 
the medical evidence that, in the absence of the treatment which the applicant seeks to have 
authorised, PM’s life is at risk. The constitutional significance afforded to the right to life is 
described by Denham J. in Re a Ward of Court at page 160 in the following terms: 
The right to life is the pre-eminent personal right. The State has guaranteed in 
its laws to respect this right. The respect is absolute. This right refers to all 
lives – all lives are respected for the benefit of the individual and for the 
common good. 
However, Denham J. continued at page 160 by stating that ‘[t]he State’s respect for the life of 
the individual encompasses the right of the individual to, for example, refuse a blood 
transfusion for religious reasons. In the recognition of the individual’s autonomy, life is 
respected.’ Thus, it is clear that respect for the right to life does not require that treatment, 
such as a blood transfusion, be imposed on a patient against his or her will in order to 
preserve the patient’s life and indeed, such imposition would fail to respect the individual’s 
right to life. 
[27] The right to bodily integrity, recognised by the Supreme Court in Ryan v Attorney 
General [1965] I.R. 284 protects the individual from violation and mutilation of their body. 
The treatment at issue in this case (blood transfusion/s and a liver transplant) would constitute 
a very grave infringement of the right to bodily integrity if imposed without the consent of 
PM. On the basis of the legal interpretation of the right to life as set out by Denham J. in Re a 
Ward of Court, the fact that treatment may save PM’s life would not justify the imposition of 
this treatment if it is imposed contrary to PM’s wishes.  
[28] Thus, PM clearly had a right to refuse the treatment. The question to be 
determined is whether she had exercised this right. 
 
Presumptions 
 [29] Given that the right to life is ‘the pre-eminent personal right’, a question arises as 
to whether the Court should adopt a presumption in favour of life so that in cases of 
uncertainty, any uncertainty will be resolved in favour of the action which saves the person’s 
life. In this case, this approach would have placed the burden of proof on PM. Given that PM 
did not have any form of representation, this would have effectively pre-determined the case.   
[30] I am not convinced that the application of a presumption on the basis of 
protection of life is desirable in a case such as this.  Applied in a general manner, it seems to 
me to unduly undermine the rights to autonomy and bodily integrity. I note also Lord 
Donaldson M.R.’s refusal to impose a presumption in favour of life in broadly similar 
circumstances in the English case Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1992] 3 
W.L.R. 782 at page 792, citing his instinctive dislike of introducing presumptions in 
‘reaching a decision of fact as crucial as this.’ Thus, the burden of showing that treatment 
should be provided must fall on JM. Having said this, I am conscious of the seriousness of 
the decision which had to be made and of the irreversible consequences of upholding the 
decision to refuse potentially life-saving treatment. It is appropriate that a court would 
proceed with great care and would scrupulously examine the evidence in such circumstances.  
 
The Evidence Provided 
 
[31] In reaching the decision to order the administration of treatment, Finnegan P. 
identified as relevant two aspects of JM’s evidence. The first related to the kind of person 
which PM was; the second related to the circumstances in which PM’s refusal of treatment 
took place. 
[32] In respect of the kind of person PM was, Finnegan P. stated at page 324 that he 
took account of the fact that PM was African and that it was part of her culture to adopt her 
husband’s religion on marriage. He found at page 325 that her decision to refuse treatment 
was because of her cultural background and her desire to please her husband and not offend 
his sensibilities: ‘[s]he was pre-occupied with her husband and his religion as a Jehovah’s 
Witness rather than with whether to have the treatment and her own welfare’. He considered 
at page 325 that, if PM was aware of her husband’s decision to seek the intervention of the 
Court, she would agree to have the treatment and would be comforted by her husband’s 
attitude. 
[33] As Irish society becomes more culturally diverse, the Irish courts must be 
increasingly careful to avoid the risks of cultural stereotyping. Clearly, not all African women 
(or indeed women from any other ethnic background) share the same cultural traits. 
Therefore, a more accurate summation of the evidence presented to Finnegan P. is that PM’s 
particular cultural heritage predisposed her to adopt her husband’s religion on marriage; that, 
as a matter of fact, she did convert on her marriage and that, accordingly, her decision to 
refuse treatment was found to derive not from her own inherent beliefs but from those of her 
husband.  
[34] Those who hold religious beliefs may do so for different reasons. Some beliefs 
derive from the religion of birth. In other instances, a person may convert to a religion at 
some point in their lives. It is feasible that a reason for conversion may be the assumption of 
the religion of one’s spouse. It is also feasible that a person’s religious belief may derive not 
from an inherent personal commitment but from an allegiance to a spousal, or indeed a 
parental, belief.  Many religious beliefs or, indeed the rejection of such beliefs, may derive 
from the cultural and social context within which the person lives. This is not to cast doubt on 
the sincerity of individual beliefs nor to indicate that individual beliefs should not be 
respected by the law. Rather, it indicates that any court should be very cautious before 
undertaking an attempt to evaluate the sincerity or depth of any individual’s religious belief. 
[35] As has been noted throughout, an unfortunate element of this case was that very 
little was known about PM. We do know however, that she was an adult. There is no 
indication that she encountered any cognitive difficulties or that she was unusually vulnerable 
or susceptible to undue influence. There is also no indication that she was subjected to such 
influence. Indeed, JM’s evidence is that when she asked him what he would do in her 
circumstances, he responded that it was her decision. Thus, there are no specific factors 
which might cause concern to the Court. Rather, the Court is being asked to evaluate the 
impact of (possible) cultural influences on a decision made. It is very difficult to see how a 
court can do this – especially in the absence of any evidence beyond that of JM, whose 
evidence, as already noted, must be viewed with some caution given the inevitable pressures 
of the unfortunate situation in which he finds himself. On this basis, I find that PM's broader 
motivations in becoming a Jehovah's Witness and the nature of her beliefs are factors which 
are beyond the purview of this Court.  
[36] The second relevant aspect of JM’s evidence related to the circumstances in 
which PM refused the treatment. From JM's evidence, it appears that, on 19th October, the 
day before PM refused to complete the consent form, she attempted to discuss the proposed 
treatment with JM, asking him what he would do, and that he responded that this was her 
decision. It seems from this that PM envisaged that the decision should be made following 
consultation within her family unit. In this, she was no different to many, perhaps most, 
people who make important decisions not in a solely self-regarding or individual way but in 
the context of their relationships with others. It may reasonably be expected that, especially 
when a person is under physical and mental stress, as PM undoubtedly was, they will look for 
some form of help or support in making difficult decisions and that family members will be 
the most likely source of support. However, it would appear from his evidence that JM did 
not engage in discussion of the matter, stating that it was PM’s own decision and leaving PM 
to think about the matter. Thus, it would appear that PM was left without any opportunity to 
discuss the decision to be made and without information about something which was clearly 
important to her – her husband’s views on the matter.  
[37] In light of this, it is perhaps no surprise that, on the following day, when her 
physical condition had deteriorated, PM vacillated between consent and refusal of the 
treatment, first agreeing to the treatment and then, apparently changing her mind when 
presented with the consent form by a member of the transplant team.  PM was seriously ill 
and vulnerable. She asked for her husband’s advice. Clearly, it is not for this Court to direct 
how spouses should respond to requests for advice. However, it is a source of concern that in 
these circumstances, there is no indication that the medical staff attempted to provide support 
to PM in reaching a decision. Thus, we find PM struggling to make a decision with very 
significant consequences for her life and the way she wished to live it. She vacillated and 
appeared to be uncertain although she ultimately refused to sign a consent form.  
[38] By identifying the absence of decision-making support in this case, I do not 
intend to suggest that an individual’s decision should be respected only where she or he has 
been provided with such support. Such a suggestion would inappropriately undermine the 
importance of the individual’s right to make decisions about how to live his or her own life. I 
emphasise the lack of support in the unique circumstances of this case because one factor 
which is clear within the very limited amount of information which this court has about the 
way in which PM’s decision was reached, is that she asked her husband what he would do 
and he responded to her that it was her decision.  
[39] As I have mentioned, this Court is not concerned with the absence of a consent 
form – this is merely a form of evidence of PM's wishes. Rather, the concern of the Court is 
with whether or not PM consented to the treatment. On the basis of the evidence before the 
Court at the time the order was made, I cannot conclude that PM’s refusal to sign the consent 
form represented a considered decision to refuse treatment.  
 
Decision 
 
[40] PM has raised two issues in respect of the decision to authorise the 
administration of appropriate medical treatment. In respect of the first, the absence of fair 
procedures, I find that there was a breach of PM’s constitutional rights which in turn had 
implications for the way in which the court considered the substantive question. I am 
conscious in making this finding of the urgency of the matter and the significant time 
pressures on the Court at the time the order was made. This was in no way the fault of the 
Court which facilitated the application in every way possible. Nonetheless, I am of the view 
that the absence of any form of representation for PM meant that the Court was unable to 
give sufficient consideration to the core element of the application, the perspective of PM. 
[41] In respect of the decision to order treatment, I have reached the same conclusion 
as Finnegan P, although for a different reason. I consider that, in the absence of clear evidence 
of undue influence, a court should be very slow to reach conclusions regarding the nature of 
an individual's religious belief. Given that relationships are infinitely variable, it is possible 
that PM's refusal emerged from her pre-occupation with her husband and his religion rather 
than from her own beliefs. It is also possible that it did not. Bearing in mind that the burden 
of proof lay on JM, I do not consider that the evidence justified that conclusion that this was 
in fact the case. 
[42] However, I am persuaded that the circumstances in which the refusal to sign the 
consent form took place do not indicate a considered decision to refuse the treatment. 
Through no fault of PM, it would appear that she was not given the support and information 
needed to reach a decision which can fairly be assumed to represent her views. In such 
circumstances, I cannot find the order to authorise the administration of treatment to 
constitute a breach of PM’s constitutional rights to autonomy and bodily integrity. In so 
finding, I would like to stress my concerns regarding the lack of decision-making support 
provided to PM by her medical advisors and to note the importance of ensuing that such 
support is made available to patients who find themselves in the difficult and distressing 
position of having to make a momentous decision of the kind faced by PM. Such cases are 
likely to be rare but when they arise in the future, I would expect that the court should be 
provided with evidence of what forms of decision-making support were provided.  
 
 
